1: Longrigg
645, 175

MH1 Iraq MH1

[For the rise and fall of various ministries, their policies and internal politics from 1900 to 1950 in Iraq, see category 116, entire source.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Faysal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Basra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's membership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahḍha Party lost support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Ali Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Bahrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muhammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Hikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Hilla to Nasiriya, the new Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Faysal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one
645 major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its
668 rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Wahid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

669 The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near
619 Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests
[687] were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

[671] [1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Haydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Ali personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Ali' first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH Iraq MH

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In advance of settlement, and pending the establishment subsequently of a General Land Register, map records should be constituted showing the position of all land authoritatively reserved for public purposes, or forming the subject of special concessions. These should be kept in duplicate through the agency of the Survey Department at the Headquarters of each liwa and in the capital. All Departments should be instructed to collaborate in the preparation and maintenance of these records, whereby the waste of public funds and the injury to public interests occasioned by conflicting arrangements and authorisations to utilise land might be quickly eliminated, without waiting for the gradual advance of settlement.

All proposed reservations of miri land, all proposed concessions and all proposed expropriations of mulk or tapu land should be examined by a small committee representing the bodies principally concerned in the administration of land or of its use for public purposes. These proposals might then be submitted with the committee's recommendations to the proper Minister, who I take it would normally be the Minister of Finance as custodian both of the public purse and of miri land. In this way all important public interests would receive consideration before land was reserved, conceded or expropriated for any special purpose. To make the record as complete as possible the location of all existing reservations, concessions, etc., should be examined and defined, so far as available information permits. In the case of urban areas the local record would most conveniently be kept in the town concerned.

Since the proposed record is in the form of maps indicating specific locations of land, the work of constructing and maintaining it should be entrusted to the Survey Department. The Headquarter Offices of the Survey would also be the best place to keep the authorised duplicates of the local maps, so that all changes could be regularly and easily incorporated. A Survey Officer might also conveniently act as the Secretary of the suggested Examining Committee.

7 and 8. Ministerial Grouping of Services

7. If settlement of rights and land valuation are undertaken on the lines recommended, four Departments of State will be required to perform important functions; but there is a sharp division in the nature of those functions, as already noted.

Two Departments will be charged with the execution of these reforms, viz. the Central Lands Office (with its settlement and valuation field parties) and the Survey Department. Two other Departments, viz. the combined Land Revenue and State Domains Department, and the Tapu Department will be charged respectively with the presentation and support during settlement and valuation (*a*) of the interests of the State as the largest landowner and the collector of land revenue and (*b*) of the registered rights to mulk, tapu and waqf interests.

The two former will be called upon to discharge the functions of impartial and disinterested investigators and recorders of duly established rights. The two latter will be called upon to expound and support as strongly and ably as possible the particular public interests or private rights for which they are responsible.

The first of these services has still to be created and attached to some Ministry. The other three are already in existence, attached respectively to the Ministries of Economics, Communications and Works, of Finance and of Justice. In pursuance of the general inadvisability of

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making avoidable changes at this stage these existing arrangements should not be disturbed. The Central Lands Office would in my opinion be most advantageously attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The supreme importance, for speedy and economical working, of the general and widespread co-operation of the provincial staff of the Ministry of the Interior, both during and in advance of settlement, has previously been emphasised. Indeed, the conduct of settlement, which so closely affects the security, contentment and peacefulness of the whole mass of land-holders and peasantry throughout the country, must in any case be a dominant interest and responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. It is better that this interest should be directly safeguarded and this responsibility directly discharged, by the Ministry most intimately concerned. The arrangements in the field for securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses, as well as for orderly conduct of operations would in any case have to be made by the provincial staff of this Ministry. Settlement Officers and their principal assistants must also for the most part be drawn from the same staff, for that staff constitutes the only body of public servants who combine the necessary qualifications with the necessary experience. Moreover if the Ministry of the Interior undertakes administrative charge of the work, it will be a simpler matter to make changes in the personnel, than it would be if such changes involved transfers to and from another Ministry each time. For while it can be said with confidence that Settlement Officers and Assistant Settlement Officers should normally be recruited from the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, it is not to be expected that all those selected will find the work congenial or will prove successful.

8. I understand that the Ministry of Finance incline to the view that the general administration of settlement and land valuation operations might more appropriately be undertaken by that Ministry. This course would, in my opinion, be inadvisable both in the financial interests of the State and in those of the proposed reforms.

It must, I think, be recognised that the Ministry of Finance occupies an essentially different position and performs essentially different functions to, all other Ministries of State. It is the primary duty of all other Ministries to administer efficiently the specific branches of the public service, executive or judicial, allotted to their control. On the other hand, the distinctive and all-important duties of the Ministry of Finance are (i) to inspire, supervise and control all the operations of Government in so far as they affect the financial position of the State, and (ii) to nurse the economic resources of the country, to study all potential sources of revenue and to make these contribute fairly and without injurious reaction to the income of the State.

The Ministry of Finance must necessarily administer its own financial services; but I venture to think that, otherwise it should aim at as complete a detachment as possible from those administrative and executive functions of Government, which it is its duty to criticise impartially and control closely from a financial standpoint. Not only do the Ministry of Finance's wide and supremely important range of financial and economic functions demand its exclusive and fullest attention, if they are to be performed with any approach to the high standard needed; but the Ministry's duty as the financial watchdog of the State cannot be discharged with the same detachment, and is unlikely to be credited with the same disinterestedness, when applied to its own proceedings.

On these grounds alone it appears to me highly undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should itself assume administrative conduct and control of a new and formidable undertaking which is no part of its financial duties.

I also believe that the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the public purse, regards itself as the natural trustee and manager of State land and I imagine that it was on this account that the duties of the late State Domains Department were resumed by the Ministry of Finance. Subject to the considerations just urged, no exception to this view is called for, and the transfer was logical. But it should be recognised that (*a*) the current management of, what may be termed, the national estate (miri) and (*b*) the proposed systematic settlement of rights and valuation of land, are not only different but mutually incompatible, undertakings. 185 645

During the process of settlement innumerable cases are bound to arise in which the immediate and direct interests of the State, as landowner, will conflict with those of private individuals. It is essential that the former shall be presented as wholeheartedly and singlemindedly as the latter, at every stage of settlement operations. This is a duty which very properly pertains to the Ministry of Finance as custodian of the public purse. For the vast territories of the national estate (miri) represent by far the most important capital asset which el 'Iraq possesses, not excepting her petroliferous deposits. As custodian and advocate of the landed interests of the State in its capacity as landowner, the Ministry of Finance occupies the position, and should be free to act without distraction, as a profoundly interested party. Subject to the general conditions of the settlement law, it should, as a general matter of principle during settlement, offer a healthy opposition through its appropriate Department to all claims to rights over land statutorily in the ownership of the State.

And similar considerations apply to the general methodical valuation of land for fiscal purposes. Here again the organisation charged with execution of the task should occupy a position of cold scientific detachment. Here again there should be provision for appeal from the decisions of the settlement authorities under proper safeguards against obstruction or frivolous abuse. Here again the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the financial interests of the State, should act as the vigilant and unhampered exponent of those interests. And here again landholders and other parties directly concerned may be relied on to exercise no less vigilance in their endeavours to ensure that the approved results do not unduly favour at their expense, either their neighbours or the State.

In short, the successful and satisfactory execution of settlement of rights and valuation of land for fiscal purposes, requires complete freedom on the part of the Ministry of Finance to defend the financial interests of the State, whether represented by its capital assets in land or its prospective revenue. And such a successful and satisfactory execution also requires a position of recognised and unchallengeable impartiality on the part of the Ministry responsible for the administrative conduct of these operations. On these further grounds also it appears to be most undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should undertake this part of the general task.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation.

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

embody previous legislation and regulations into the General Education Law of 1940. Under this law it was directed that 'The Ministry of Education shall undertake to create a nation sound in body and mind and character'. So far as primary education was concerned it was provided that it should be free, that the age of admission to the primary school should not be less than six and that the period should be six years. It was also decreed that 'Primary education shall be obligatory and shall be carried out in the districts assigned by the Ministry of Education when necessary facilities are available. Pupils' guardians infringing this Article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three dinars'.

By this time the administration of education had been highly systematized and it remains so in the hands of the Ministry of Education centred in Baghdad. A feature of this administration is its very high degree of centralization, with the Ministry of Education controlling and supervising the most minute details both of curricula and expenditure. The Minister of Education himself appears to exercise a greater control of detail than in other countries. Under the Minister primary education is directed by a Director-General of Primary Education. In each of the fourteen provinces of Iraq there is a Provincial Director of Education who is, in reality, the agent of the Ministry of Education, and is in no sense a local official responsible to a local authority.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION

Although legal provision for compulsory primary education was made in the General Education Law of 1940, as a reality it does not exist in any part of Iraq. Over the whole of the country out of an estimated total of 750,000 children of primary school age, not more than 175,000 attend primary schools.

Shortly after the passing of the General Education Law of 1940 an attempt was made to apply its compulsory primary education provisions in two of the provinces. Apparently, however, the declaration of compulsory education in these two provinces failed in its object. The main reasons for this failure were the poverty of the majority of the parents who were unable to dispense with the labour of their children on the land, the mobility of part of the population which was still in a semi-nomadic state, and the inability to persuade teachers to live in remote villages where housing facilities and other amenities are most inadequate. It is also stated that, these economic and social reasons apart, other factors such as the unwillingness of the local courts to inflict the legal penalties for non-attendance and the active opposition of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Although the main obstacle to further educational development in Iraq is that of finance, and although it is difficult to see how sufficient money will be forthcoming for this and other social purposes until fiscal and land reforms are undertaken, there exist other obstacles to educational progress which are more of a political and administrative nature. 871

Lack of Continuity in Educational Policy. An undoubted obstacle to the pursuance of a consistent and steady development in the direction of compulsory education is a lack of continuity and positive direction in educational policy. This seems to have obtained for a long time. It is a somewhat delicate matter to discuss but, looking back over the history of educational administration since the formation of the first Iraqi Government, one is confronted with very frequent changes of Minister of Education, less frequent but still too frequent changes both of officials and in the organization of the Ministry of Education, and lack of consistency in policy with constantly fluctuating emphasis on this or that aspect of educational development. One type of school or administration may be here one year and gone the next. This is particularly true of devices for the training of rural teachers; institutions have been started and then discarded before an evaluation of their real usefulness has been possible. 871 645

These changes of policy and of personnel have been due to both political and sectarian factors which it is not possible fully to discuss in this investigation, but of which those concerned with them or affected by them are only too well aware.

Circumstances of this kind tend to produce even in the best officials and educators a sense of frustration. They also make it extremely difficult for the most able Minister of Education to promote a well-founded policy with any assurance that it will be carried out by his successors.

The Problem of the Administration of Education. Administration of the public services in Iraq is generally characterized by its high degree of centralization. This was perhaps inevitable when Iraq as an independent nation was still young and had neither the time nor the resources to work out new arrangements whereby the localities might participate more in the business of government. Further, a somewhat 'tight' central administration was part of the process of ensuring national unity. [646]

Educational administration provides no exception to this practice of centralization. Curricula are laid down by the Ministry of

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

645 871 Education, as are textbooks and the conduct of examinations. The central authority trains the teachers, appoints and dismisses them. Salaries are paid from the central treasury. Apparently no Government school or training institution has funds of its own, and the schools appear to have little freedom in the choice of books and equipment. The daily time-table of the school is determined by the national Primary School Regulations. As has been stated earlier, there are Provincial Directors of Education, but these are direct employees of the Ministry of Education and are their local representatives.

Such a highly centralized system was, of course, indispensable in the early stages when administrative talent was at a premium and when local government institutions did not exist. But it is accompanied by disadvantages and may, in the long run, as schools increase and the amount of detailed central administration grows, have the adverse effect of hindering the Ministry of Education from concentrating on their essential task of promoting a broad policy of national educational development. From conversations with senior officials of the Ministry of Education, the writer gained the impression that, through sheer pressure of daily detail, they were prevented from devoting sufficient of their time and talents to consideration of major issues.

This degree of centralization in a capital city which is so distant from many of the provincial centres and schools, and under which schools must inevitably be treated *en masse*, is also possibly a contributory factor in maintaining the over-rigidity which applies in many of the schools. Schools which are required to work in detail according to central regulations may fail to develop individuality and personality.

871 *The Problem of Differing Regional Needs.* Another feature which suggests that the time is arriving when it will be necessary to decentralize some of the administration of education is that, although the total population of Iraq is relatively small, there exist great regional differences. The needs of urban Baghdad and its surrounding province differ greatly from those of the nomads in Muntifiq and Northern Mosul. The problems of the Marsh Arabs of Amara are not those of the Kurds in Erbil and Sulaimaniya.

000 National unity is an imperative consideration, but it would be unfortunate if the requirements of conformity to a centrally conceived educational system had the effect in any way of conflicting with regional cultures and distinctively local ways of life. If this were so it might, in the long run, not serve the cause of unity.

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875 teaching which are now appearing in the top classes of the primary schools suggest that the Iraqi teacher is by no means rigidly conservative in method, and is quick to apply new techniques when his eyes have been opened to them.

During the last year or two, however, possibly because of the need to find money to cope with the additional numbers of children who are presenting themselves for admission into primary schools, it has apparently been difficult to finance courses for teachers. It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it is possible to organize courses for serving teachers, not only in specific subjects, but also of a more general nature. The necessarily brief and restricted training which has had to be provided for many of the teachers in the past means that the educational horizons of some of the serving teachers are not as broad as they might well be. If it is still felt that the cost of many residential courses of a general nature cannot yet be met, consideration might be given to the possibility of taking short courses to the teachers themselves in the teachers' clubs which exist up and down the country.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE PROVINCES

871 In addition to these evidences of advance in the schools and among
645 the teachers, there are also signs of certain trends in the provinces which, as will be seen later, may be highly significant as aids to the ultimate implementation of plans for the promotion of compulsory education.

The Beginnings of Local Educational Administration. Until very recently, the impetus for educational development in Iraq has, as already pointed out, come from the centre. The Ministry of Education has not only supervised the national system but has also provided most of the schools and most of the money. It has also taken the administrative initiative. There are now indications, even in the remoter provinces, that the people are wanting to have their share in educational development. If these trends, as some of the people in the provinces maintain, are real evidence of the beginnings of a public concern about education they are, indeed, most important.

One hopeful sign is that, despite their very limited powers and the fact that certain of the Provincial Directors of Education are afraid to take any initiative without previous sanction from the Ministry of Education, some of the Directors are exhibiting considerable energy and initiative in promoting local educational advance. In some of the provinces the Directors complain about

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the lack of suitable school buildings and the fact that they have to refuse children admission to schools, but pessimistically maintain that no progress can be made because the Ministry of Education cannot or will not find the money for them. But others are showing real enterprise and, in co-operation with the Provincial Governor, are building new schools with money obtained from local contributions.

In one province, through the initiative and persistence of an energetic Director of Education who has that commendable combination of qualities desirable in an educational administrator, namely a sense of vocation and a love of children, five well-designed new primary schools and three similar intermediate schools are being built at the time of writing, mainly out of local contributions. In the same province the Director of Education has built a new and well furnished kindergarten school, and has provided a central playing field and changing rooms through money collected locally. When he came to the province some four years ago there were twenty-eight primary schools. There are now fifty-four and the number will soon have increased to sixty.

Local initiative of this kind is of great significance. It suggests that the way to advance is not only through schemes that may be produced in the Ministry of Education itself, but also through the energies of people on the spot who know local needs and the ways and means of meeting them. This provincial effort also suggests that, despite limitations imposed by the central budget, money for educational development on no modest scale can be obtained from local resources when there is local initiative and enterprise. True, local voluntary contributions towards the building of new schools are not in the long run the best means of financing local educational provision, because such sources may not be regular and may dry up with changes in the circumstances of the charitable donors. Ultimately, such contributions will need to be supplemented by more regularly and equitably distributed local taxes. But these attempts to meet locally some of the costs of the educational provision are likely to be important future means of financing educational advance at a greater pace than appears to be practicable by reliance on central exchequer sources alone. Extra taxes are of course never popular but, when additional monies for educational purposes have to be found, it may prove that the levying of local taxes by a local administration is likely to prove less obnoxious to the psychology of people of tribal origin who have an inherent dislike of distant central government.

Awakening Educational Consciousness in the Localities. After travelling through most of the provinces of Iraq, and discussing possibilities

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CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq.

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings.

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided

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871 645 185 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age. Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 185 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required, consideration will have to be given once more to two major administrative reforms which were advocated by the special committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

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educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

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871 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

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Programmes of study, especially those for the rural and agricultural schools, need much thought and study by those who administer them. Ultimately, local development plans for advance towards compulsory schooling will need most careful consideration. These vital tasks cannot be undertaken adequately until the Ministry of Education is relieved of much of its present stifling day-to-day detail.

THE CREATION OF LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the significant social and educational developments in Iraq is the growth of local interest in education which is accompanied by some vigorous local administrative initiative and a preparedness to find money for local development. This suggests that, quite apart from the Ministry of Education being able to clear its own decks for action by passing on much of the details of administration to the provincial education officers, there exist in the localities valuable means by which a policy of advance towards compulsory education could be facilitated.

A movement in the direction of enlisting the aid of the provinces in the increase of educational provision was considered a few years ago. Under the Provincial Administration Law of 1945, a General Provincial Council was established in each province. It was empowered, in a limited way, to levy local taxes to support various local services, including some aspects of education. For one reason or another, the exercise of these local taxing powers in relation to education appears to have been restricted by the administrative action of the central Government departments. It is understood, however, that a more vigorous attempt is about to be made to give the General Provincial Council in every province wider powers of control over education up to and including the primary schools.

It is to be hoped that, when this transfer of certain powers to the General Provincial Councils takes place, it will be done in such a way that local interest in education is given full opportunity. It would be a great aid to local desire for educational powers and advance if each General Provincial Council were instructed to create amongst its members a Provincial Education Committee to which would be delegated the task both of controlling local primary schools and of developing primary education. There can be no doubt from conversations which have taken place that local people are anxious to exercise these powers. There is equally no doubt that, with some exceptions, the Provincial Directors of

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and of 'Iraqis in general to forsake time-honoured systems and procedure may have risen from reluctance to abandon that which had been sanctified by usage and by religious sanction, as well as from an innate shrewdness in avoiding what had not yet been proven to their satisfaction.

The immediate demands of practical administration may have required the British sponsors of the new Government to acquiesce to a great extent in this attitude. Nevertheless, the failure of the provisional council to consolidate such gains as had been made by the Civil Administration and to throw itself whole-heartedly into the task of creating a new state in accordance with the best examples before it, bound the new regime to antiquated systems at the very moment when they were being rejected by the lineal heirs of the Ottoman Empire as unsuitable for the new Turkish State. It marked the tendency of 'Iraq to

TABLE IV

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTS AMONG MINISTRIES.*

(a) Ministry of Interior:
- General Administration
- Police
- Land Revenue and Excise
- Agriculture
- Jails
- Printing and Publishing

(b) Ministry of Finance:
- Finance
- Accounts
- Audit
- Ottoman Debt and special revenues

(c) Ministry of Justice:
- Judicial, etc.
- Tapu

(d) Ministry of Defence:
- Levies
- Gendarmes
- Local Forces

(e) Ministry of Education and Health:
- Education
- Health Services
- Municipalities (as temporary measure)

(f) Ministry of Works and Communications:
- Buildings
- Roads
- Railways
- Posts and Telegraphs
- Irrigation
- Surveys

(g) Ministry of Commerce:
- Commerce
- Customs
- Port

(h) Ministry of Auqaf:
- Waqfs
- Trusts

* *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B.363, p. 3.

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643 his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

643 645 In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,[1] not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.[2] In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqīb's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqīb's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.[3] The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly aginst the *'Ulamā* in June of that year.[4] The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.[5] Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

[1] It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

[2] 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqāddam* or Government Party. Yāsin Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

[3] *Supra*, p. 357 [4] Ibid., pp. 392-3. [5] Ibid., p. 412

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Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

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643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives at his Court. Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

[1] See translation of Rashīd 'Alī's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

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667 that personal ambition of the leaders had no small part in the events of October 29th and afterwards.

At one time it was suspected that King Ghāzī might have been cognizant of the plot, his impatience at the limitations placed on his power being well-known.[1] His assurances to the contrary appeared to be sincere, particularly in the light of subsequent events. Indeed, Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat Sulaimān, supported by the armed forces, may be regarded as possessing sole power in 'Iraq to-day despite published statements that General Sidqī would concern himself solely with the re-organization of the army, that the Government would work with a freely elected Parliament and that the rights of all section of the people would be respected.

Council of Ministers

645 Among the principal factors which have adversely affected the position and the functioning of the Council of State may be listed its susceptibility to outside influence, its instability, not altogether unrelated as has already been indicated, and the lack of a sufficiently large class of 'Iraqīs of Cabinet rank.

In the period from August, 1921, to October, 1932, the average life of the fourteen Cabinets was less than ten months each. Four Ministries, the second of the Naqīb, that of Taufīq Beg, the fourth of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg and that of Nājī Pasha, lasted less than four months each. Nūrī Pasha's first Cabinet, by remaining in office from March 23rd, 1930,[2] to October 19th 1931, had the longest existence although its tenure was not undisturbed by internal dissensions. Such instability, due largely to the King's influence, to the conflict of British and

[1] *Al-Ayyām* (Damascus), November 3rd, 1936, cites Baqir Sidqī, however, as saying: 'In no way have I proceeded in any action against the will of H.M. the King and of the Supreme Power.'

[2] *Waqayi' al-'Iraqiya* (Government Gazette), No. 844, March 27th, 1930.

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'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat

[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

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645 669 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 185 [307] Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 648 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

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Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the exiled 'Iraqīs and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqīs who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shī'īs and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqīs.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

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forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and

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alluvial plain of the centre and south, where agriculture depends on the water of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation by pump, flow, or natural inundation. In the first region rainfed winter cereals predominate, with millet, maize, sesame and other summer crops grown as subsidiaries where irrigation is possible. Kurdish mountain crops include tobacco and grapes. In the central canal zone (Faluja–Baghdad–Diala) wheat and barley are the principal winter crops; summer crops include millet, maize, sesame, and the produce of market gardens near Baghdad. From here southward barley and rice predominate, with a great concentration of palm groves in all the riverain land, especially around Basra on the Shatt al-Arab. The deserts of west Iraq afford extensive grazing after the winter rains.

Cultivation is based traditionally on the following system. In the south, either half the land is left fallow and half tilled each year, or half is sown with a summer crop, half with a winter. In the north the land may be continuously cropped for two or three years, and then left fallow for the same period. The use of artificial fertilizers is practically unknown, but the land is sometimes manured by allowing shepherd tribes to pasture their flocks on fallow ground.

Although the vast majority of agricultural implements employed are still traditional and primitive, modern machinery is being imported steadily. A high target has been set, especially since the war, and Government service stations have been established. In 1950 imports were as follows: tractors 166, ploughs 146, cultivators 26, combines 98, threshers 1, grain drills 21, disc harrows 14. Oil pumps for irrigation are even more in demand than tractors; in 1949–50 there were 3,600 in use, with an average horse-power of 36.

The agricultural development of the country is organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which contains departments for plant breeding and protection, horticulture, forestry, agricultural machinery, animal husbandry and veterinary services.

Crops

The principal crops, with their production in 1950 in thousands of metric tons, are *Winter*: barley, 851; wheat, 520; lentils, 6; vetch, 3·5; linseed, 0·2; *Summer*: rice, 242; cotton, 25; sesame, 10; maize, 21; millet 19; green gram, 12; tobacco, 3 (purchased by Government Tobacco Monopoly); dates, 250.[1] Of the two most important crops, barley and dates, the former is grown mainly in the northern plains and the *liwas* of Kut, Muntafiq, Hilla, and Diwaniya in the irrigated zone. With a

[1] ibid. p. 146.

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642 646 joint meeting, such draft law shall be considered to have been passed by both Assemblies, but shall not become law until it has been confirmed by the King. If not passed in this manner, such draft law shall not be reintroduced into either Assembly during the current session.

Part IV

The Council of Ministers

642 645 Art. 64 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The number of Ministers shall not be less than seven, including the Prime Minister. No person shall be a Minister who is under any disqualification described in Article 30.

A Minister who is not a member of either Assembly shall not remain in office longer than six months unless he is appointed a senator or elected a deputy before the end of that period. A Minister who receives the salary of a minister shall not, at the same time, receive the membership allowance in either Assembly. A Minister shall not buy or lease any of the property or possessions of the State.

2) Deputy Ministers may be appointed provided that they must be members of Parliament.

3) In case of necessity the King may appoint Ministers without portfolio, in order to obtain the benefit of their experience and talents.

Art. 65 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* The Council of Ministers will undertake the direction of the affairs of the State. It will meet, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, to decide the measures to be taken in matters which concern more than one Ministry and in all important matters which concern the Ministries. The Prime Minister will submit the decisions of the Council to the King, for his confirmation.

Art. 66. Ministers of State shall be jointly responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for affairs dealt with by the various Ministries and responsible severally for acts relating to each of the Ministries and Departments attached thereto. Should the Chamber of Deputies pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet by a majority of members present, the Cabinet must resign. If the resolution in question relates to one Minister only, such Minister must resign.

At the request of the Prime Minister or of the Minister concerned, the Chamber shall, once only, postpone a vote of no confi-

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dence for a period not exceeding eight days. The Chamber shall not be dissolved during that period.

Art. 67. A Minister shall despatch all business relating to his Ministry and departments attached thereto in manner prescribed by law.

PART V

THE JUDICATURE

Art. 68. Judges shall be appointed by Royal Irada and may only be removed in the circumstances mentioned in the special law dealing with the conditions governing their qualifications, appointment, grades and method of dismissal.

Art. 69. The Courts shall be divided into three classes:

1. Civil Courts.
2. Religious Courts.
3. Special Courts.

Art. 70. The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws, subject to the provisions of this law.

Art. 71. The Courts shall be free from all interference in the conduct of their affairs.

Art. 72. All sittings of the Courts shall be open to the public, unless some legal justification exists for holding sittings *in camera*. Judgments of the Courts, as well as the proceedings thereof, may be published, except those relating to sittings held *in camera*. All judgments shall issue in the name of the King.

Art. 73. The Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in Iraq, in all actions and civil and criminal matters, and those brought by or against the Iraq Government, with the exception of actions and matters coming within the jurisdiction of the religious or special Courts, as stated hereinafter in this law, or in any other law in force.

Art. 74. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts includes civil, commercial and criminal matters, in accordance with the laws in force, provided that, in matters relating to the personal status of foreigners and in other civil and commercial matters in which by international custom the terms of the law of a foreign country are to be applied,

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Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

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The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 83 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

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In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1952 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

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Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions, to the end of March 1954 as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1 000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6 000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2 500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,953
Total	14 113